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| Ethical Perspectives |
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| Issue : 16/2 (June - 2009) |
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| Disagreement, perspectivism, consequentialism |
| Arnold Burms |
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Page : 155 - 163 |
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Theoretical reflection on moral disagreement can be pertinent from a practical point of view. When far reaching policies depend on agreement about conflicting moral options, the need may be felt to reflect on strategies for reducing conflict and reaching a consensus. In such a context, it may for instance be useful to study mechanisms that tend to bring about bias and prejudice. In this paper, however, I will not be concerned with whatever might be done to reduce disagreement. My approach will be purely theoretical and will concentrate on the nature of moral disagreement, more particularly on the question how disagreement about conflicting moral claims differs from disagreements about conflicting empirical claims. This will lead me to the defence of a kind of perspectivism. I will argue for the view that moral disagreement is to be expected if morality is intimately associated with the quest for meaning. I will conclude by making a couple of critical remarks about a doctrine (consequentialism) that tries to free morality from the quest for meaning and hence also from perspectivism. |
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| Recent issue 17/2 (2010) |
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