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| Ethical Perspectives |
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| Issue : 16/3 (September - 2009) |
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| Introduction |
| Bart Pattyn |
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Page : 281 - 282 |
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Ethicists tend to enjoy an extraordinary status in the scientific world, in spite of the fact that their knowledge is not based on empirical facts or logical principles. When they philosophise, they appear to be intervening in a discussion that started long before they existed and will probably continue long after they have disappeared. They are inclined, after all, to base their arguments on convictions. If you point this out, most people will more than likely admit that their ethical principles are indeed based on convictions that have acquired a self-evident character in our actual day-to-day relations although they cannot be solidly founded. It is virtually impossible to strengthen or weaken the capacity of moral convictions by trying to justify them.
In our everyday interactions, discussions intended to justify or defend something never start from absolute zero. All sorts of authoritative points of departure established in the course of history inevitably insinuate themselves from the very outset. Empirical scientists often believe that what they introduce into the debate is based on bare, unadulterated facts. But even here questions can be raised. Empirical scientists use language and participate in discussions in which unspoken presuppositions are just about everywhere. The very act of speaking presupposes that we already have a notion of what our addressee understands by the expressions we use. Without a perspective on what the other can be generally presumed to understand, none of us will be able to picture the kind of impression our interventions will have on others or understand their interventions in the way they are expected to be understood. Those who are unable to distinguish the items relevant for discussion from the endless stream of fragmented experiences because they have no idea of the frame of reference within which associations are ultimately established, will likewise have no idea what is going on. Without this frame of reference we are lost.
One of the problems that would appear to be confronting the humanities today is the exponential numerical growth of frames of reference, which has resulted in an inevitable decline in the existence of broad-based debate. Modern methods of communication have made it possible to find enough dialogue partners within every specialised frame of reference to maintain group-specific discussions that interest no one in the external forum. This sort of compartmentalisation of academic potential tends to result in a situation in which the theoreticians and those endowed with more practical common sense are no longer on the same wavelength and no longer understand one another. It is clear to one and all that the humanities are in need of interdisciplinary debate, but are there enough scholars willing to dismantle their technical jargon in order to facilitate such debate?
Theoretical and methodological plurality would appear to be even greater in the domain of ethics. The debate concerning the relationship between fundamental and applied ethics has a long history. The same discussion will no doubt have to be pursued today within the context of the fragmentation of the humanities and the social sciences, a theme that certainly deserves further reflection.
Bart Pattyn |
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| Recent issue 17/2 (2010) |
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