19-06-2013
Ethical Perspectives
   
 
 Promoting international dialogue between fundamental and applied ethics
 
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Recent issue  20/1 (2013)
Introduction: Critical Perspectives on Global Politics and Globalization
(Annelies Decat)
In The Beginning There Was and Will Have Been the World or Who's Afraid of the Nation-State?
(Andréa B. Gill)
Cosmopolitan Ethics from Below
(Gilbert Leung)
Care Drain as an Issue of Global Gender Justice
(Anca Gheaus)
What If We Took Autonomous Recovery Seriously? A Democratic Critique of Contemporary Western Ethical Foreign Policy
(Olivia Umurerwa Rutazibwa)
Obamacare and Conscientious Objection. Some Introductory Thoughts
(Nir Eyal)
Religious Liberty, Conscience, and the Affordable Care Act
(Holly Fernandez Lunch)
Conscience and Health
(Elizabeth Fenton)
Taxation, Conscientious Objection and Religious Freedom
(Annabelle Lever)
Can Moral Integrity Warrant Opposition to Tax-Funded Healthcare?
(Noam Zohar)
Conscientious Objection, Coercion, the Affordable Care Act, and US States
(Glenn Cohen)
The Use and Abuse of Religious Freedom
(Peter Singer)
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Ethical Perspectives
Issue : 19/1 (March - 2012)
Germ-line Enhancements and Rough Equality
Michele Loi
   Page : 55 - 82
  Enhancements of the human germ-line introduce further inequalities in the competition for scarce goods, such as income and desirable social positions. Social inequalities, in turn, amplify the range of genetic inequalities that access to germ-line enhancements may produce. From an egalitarian point of view, inequalities can be arranged to the benefit of the worst-off group (for instance, through general taxation), but the possibility of an indefinite growth of social and genetic inequality raises legitimate concerns. It is argued that inequalities produced by markets of germ-line enhancements are just if it they are embedded in a framework of social institutions that satisfies two conditions: (i) Rawls’ Difference Principle, which states that inequalities of income and wealth should benefit the worst-off group; (ii) the lexically prior 'principle of rough equality', which states that citizens’ initial life-chances should be similar enough, so that extreme inequalities in income, wealth and power are not produced or accumulated through institutions justified by the Difference Principle. The principle of rough equality replaces the Rawlsian principles of the Fair Value of the Political Liberties and Fair Equality of Opportunity in a post-genomic society and expresses a concern with background political equality, which is argued to be a condition of the freedom and equality of citizens that should not be traded off with material benefits. Extreme inequalities are defined in terms of political equality.
       
 
 
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