The Historical Roots of Personalism:

From Renouvier’s Le Personnalisme, Mounier’s Manifeste au service du personnalisme and Maritain’s Humanisme intégral to Janssens’ Personne et Société

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ABSTRACT. The present article focuses on American and European personalism during the early part of the twentieth century (up to 1939). The immediate predecessor of the personalist movement as such was the philosopher Rudolf Hermann Lotze who inspired two of his students, Methodist Borden Parker Bowne and Rudolf Eucken. In France, in the meantime, Charles Renouvier published his Le personnalisme in 1903, while Emmanuel Mounier later presented personalism as a new political philosophy under the influence Alexandre Marc’s comments on Nicolai Hartmann’s Ethik. Mounier’s Manifeste au service du personnalisme (1936) develops a dialectical critique on both liberal bourgeois individualism and all forms of collectivism, all, in his opinion, ‘inverted theocracies’ with shared dehumanizing tendencies. As alternative, it was necessary for personalism to become the leading spiritual and philosophical guide in order to Refaire la Renaissance (Esprit 1 [1932] 5-51). As a matter of fact, Jacques Maritain’s Humanisme intégral (1936) might justly be considered a first attempt to describe the nature of a new civilization in any detail. Maritain is more explicit on the Christian face of this new humanism, while refuting any kind of man-centred humanism. Mounier’s and Maritain’s personalist ideas together with Max Scheler’s non-formal ethics of value and his Aktlehre had a considerable influence on Louis Janssens. In Personne et société (1939) he not only criticizes several contemporary European ideologies in line with Mounier, but he also accepts that persons can only be really known by co-operation, in line with Scheler’s idea of inter-subjectivity and Aquinas’ idea of the social nature of the human being. Following Maritain, Janssens distinguishes between the human being as individual and the human person. Individuality contains a material component, characterized by its concrete position in space and time, while the person and his/her spiritual component (‘le moi spirituel’) facilitate a movement away from the self towards others in freedom and love. The person is not only understood as the highest value, he/she is able to control the hierarchy of values by his/her ordo amoris, a flexible undertaking influenced by the love of others in which love opens each person for growth towards higher values.

KEYWORDS. Personalism, Renouvier, Mounier, Maritain, Janssens.
I. Introduction

Both Albert C. Knudson, author of *The Philosophy of Personalism. A Study in the Metaphysics of Religion* (1927), and Hubert E. Langan, author of *The Philosophy of Personalism and Its Educational Applications* (1935), state that personalism can be traced back to the Greek philosophers Plato and Plotinus. The personalist tradition’s debt to Plato consists of: “The superiority of thought to sense, the objectivity of the ideal, the speculative significance of self-activity, the shadowy and unsubstantial character of matter, various arguments for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul” (Knudson 1969, 428-429). Significant for personalism is Plato’s presentation of the logical, the ideal, and the self-active as the true being. Plotinus defines more precisely the immateriality of both the divine spirit and the human, stressing the unique nature of self-conscious beings. More so than Plato, Plotinus reduces nature to absolute nonbeing. In addition to Plato and Plotinus, Knudson refers to Augustine as the first personalist, in a certain sense, because of the latter’s description of the person as a unity of mental life and will. From Augustine onwards, self-certainty has been used as the starting point of philosophy, and self-knowledge has been considered the basis for valid metaphysics.

Thomas Aquinas adapted Boethius’ definition of the person. Boethius is the very first to define personhood, “a person is the individual substance [or subsistence] of a rational nature [persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia]” (Knudson 1969, 81). For Boethius, *substantia* means that accidents are excluded, since accidents cannot constitute persons. *Individua* is a qualification referring to genus and species which cannot be further subdivided. *Rationalis naturae* means that personhood is ascribed only to intellectual beings. Aquinas reinterprets Boethius’ definition and uses it to specify Aristotle’s rather vague notion of ‘active reason’ in an individualistic sense. For Aquinas, *individua substantia* means “*substantia, completa, per se subsistens, separata ab alis,*” i.e. a substance, complete, subsisting of itself, separate from all else. He adds to this ‘*rationalis naturae,*’ in
order to present a definition of the person that consists of five characteristics: (1) substance – excluding accidents; (2) completeness – it forms a complete nature; (3) *per se subsistens* – the person is *sui generis*, exists in him/herself and for her/himself, the ultimate subject of his/her nature and acts; (4) *separata ab aliis* – excluding the universal; (5) *rationalis naturae* – excluding all non-intellectual life and non-living forms. Since active reason alone is immortal, a basis is established for belief in the personal immortality of the human being (Copleston 1982, 175ff.).

Knudson further explains that René Descartes “broke the spell which the Aristotelian distinction between matter and form has exercised over the human mind for almost two thousand years, and put in its place a radical distinction between thought and extension or mind and body, thus making the mind independent of the body and by virtue of its own unique self-identity capable of an immortal destiny” (Knudson 1969, 430-431). In so doing, Descartes makes a powerful contribution to the development of personalism. Leibnitz defines more precisely the notion of individuality and Berkeley further stresses the immateriality of personhood, thereby developing a kind of metaphysical personalism. The ideas of Immanuel Kant – who cannot be considered a metaphysical personalist – concerning the creative activity of thought lay the foundation for a kind of ethical personalism, justifying, by his doctrine of practical reason, the freedom and immortality of the human being.

The immediate predecessor of the actual personalist movement was the German philosopher Rudolf Hermann Lotze. Lotze influenced Max Scheler through one of his pupils, the Jena philosopher Rudolf Eucken. For Lotze, the self is a presupposition of thought and is characterized by free will: without a thinker gifted with reason and intellect, there can be no thoughts. Maybe the most important student of Lotze was the Methodist Borden Parker Bowne, who is nowadays considered to be the founding father of American personalism, a more metaphysically oriented strand of the personalist tradition. In 1876, and having completed his studies in Paris and Göttingen, Bowne was called to teach philosophy at
Boston University, where he held the chair for many years. Knudson was a student of Bowne. In his *Microcosmos: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World* (1856-1864), Lotze holds that complete and perfect personality inheres only in God; human beings are only a pale copy thereof: “The finiteness of the finite is not a producing condition of this personality but a limit and a hindrance of its development” (Burrow 2006, 75). Knudson tells us that Bowne transcends Lotze in two main respects. First, personality, based on the soul’s life, is the key to reality. He will make it the one great systematizing principle of his philosophy. Second, he adds to Lotze by accentuating the importance of free self-activity and making freedom a touchstone of reality. Only the free is real. Lotze, of course, also recognizes the essential feature of freedom but, unlike Bowne, he does not give it equal weight with self-consciousness. Knudson concludes: “For him [=Bowne] freedom was thus constitutive both of knowledge and of reality” (Knudson 1969, 435).

It was Eucken and not Lotze who ultimately became well-known in the Anglo-Saxon world. In 1912-1913, he was invited as an Exchange Professor to lecture in Boston (Boston University) and New York (Columbia University) where he met the French philosopher Henri Bergson (Eucken 1921, 163-164). Eucken believes that we are not yet fully developed personalities, but persons in the making, slowly moulded by social influences. Personality is created and “finds itself only as it takes its place and renders service in the social movements which surround it” (Hermann 1912, 78). In particular, he blames Protestant Christianity for its religious individualist ‘plague’ since the Reformation: “Our public ethic is so crude and un-Christian, not because a world with its back to Christ is defeating the endeavors of the Christian social conscience among us, but because of the parochial preoccupations of a Church sapped by private pieties, congregational busy-nesses, dilettante theosophies, romantic philanthropies. (…) And, if the Church is to be saved, it must turn from the quietist and romantic conception of religion as an ambulance, or as a delicate and esoteric culture for chastened minds, to the Gospel of an abounding life, the secret of the true *joie de vivre*” (Hermann 1912, 80).
II. CHARLES RENOUVIER’S *LE PERSONNALISME* (1903)

In 1903, the French philosopher Charles Renouvier (1815-1903) published his book *Le personnalisme* in which personalism (Préface: “Personnalisme, ou doctrine de la personnalité”) is proposed for the first time as a new philosophical system (for William Logue more accurately called a ‘philosophy of liberty’ [1993, 13]). In his earlier work *Science de la morale* (1869), Renouvier defends his conception of freedom against all sorts of menaces. Both the social sciences and the natural sciences are incapable of furnishing a solid basis for the defense of freedom. Constructing such a basis for freedom is, for Renouvier, the core of any moral philosophical enterprise. While considering Catholic moral teaching to be hostile to liberty, he is convinced that “the decline of faith in the West could not result in a triumph of rationalist secular morals but in the domination of new ethical systems of heteronomy based on social-scientific doctrines” (Logue 1993, 42). His lack of trust in social-scientific approaches to ethical questions is based on the presumption that they often have “the tendency to absorb the individual in the community and to undermine the sense of individual responsibility that is basic to the Western moral tradition” (Logue 1993, 44). Renouvier’s original contribution to the personalist movement is the idea that any kind of community has to be built on the primacy of the individual while avoiding anarchist or libertarian illusions.

In order to understand his position, some more information on nineteenth-century France is required. In this period, individualism was evolving into the dominant characteristic in Western Europe. The individualist mentality was accepted as a fact, both by traditionalists looking for the restoration of a pre-modern Christian community and by Comteans looking forward to the scientific age soon to come. Yet nearly all agreed that there was a need to find ways to construct new links between the individual and the community; if possible, ways that were compatible with the new individualist attitude. Indeed, some even denied that there was a problem, like the *laissez-faire* economists who trusted in Adam Smith’s invisible hand. By contrast, many social scientists hoped to learn
– from their use of empirical methods – what holds societies together in order to predict how a society of individualist beings could be made to work. Renouvier’s standpoint lies somewhere between the *laissez-faire* position and the social order/constructivist position. He focuses not so much on a possible collapse of the social order, but worries more about the possibility that the social order might restrict or even crush the individual’s freedom.

Renouvier’s view of the relationship between the individual and the community is a complicated one. He recognizes that the individual owes a great deal to society and his fellow human beings – for both good and evil. Each individual desires a better society, defined as a society that promotes individual freedom and enhances opportunities to live morally. But what comes first, the reform of institutions or the reform of individuals? For Renouvier, both are interconnected, but it is not a vicious circle. He seems sceptical about all attempts to create a new man/person by reforming institutions, since all such proposals assume an unreasonable belief in perfect institutions. On the other hand, he is not as pessimistic as Schopenhauer. Altering individuals, in spite of the many difficulties, is possible because human beings are gifted with free will, however badly we may exercise it. Only free men and women can join each other to make freer institutions. Logue rightly concludes that Renouvier’s social philosophy rests on a *croyance*: “the freely chosen belief in the reality of man’s freedom. He shows us that though reason denies us exaggerated hopes for this world, it also protects us against exaggerated despair” (1993, 45).

Although Renouvier was sensitive to the appeal of the ideological movements of the second half of the nineteenth century, he never became an apologist for one tendency or another. Belief in the immortality of either science or a particular kind of philosophy of history should be seen as the real enemy of freedom. The refusal to erect social absolutes without giving up the pursuit of justice and truth were to become characteristic of the personalist tradition. Renouvier attributes this idea to his last
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philosophy, *personnalisme*, but it is *de facto* present throughout his entire oeuvre: “We must not aim at absolute perfection, nor at absolute justice; we must fight with all our strength to bring a little more justice into the world … Whether we are to be our own makers depends in part on our reason and on our reasonable use of our liberty” (1930, 64).

III. EMMANUEL MOUNIER’S MANIFESTE AU SERVICE DU PERSONNALISME
— A PERSONALIST MANIFESTO

Mounier (1905-1950) was convinced that the continuing economical and political crises of the second quarter of the twentieth century, the early and mid-1930’s (Hitler’s Nazi regime in Germany, the fascist government in Italy, and communist party rule in Russia), had “reached a turning point”, a crisis of civilization, resulting in a devaluation of the human being. Only a ‘revolution’ and a ‘new order’ based on a ‘new philosophy of man and society’, in this case personalism, could respond to these crises. In fact, the words are those of Alexandre Marc (his real name: Alexandre Marcovitch Lipiansky), a Russian emigrant and Jew, living in Paris, founder of the *Ordre Nouveau*, who described personalism for the first time in 1931 as a new political philosophy. The term is first used in Marc’s rhetoric against Marxist Russia.¹¹ In 1929, and after reading chapter 19 – *Subjekt und Person* – of Nicolai Hartmann’s *Ethik*, Marc proposed linking ontological and axiological foundations of the person as a free subject. He became convinced that the metaphysics of the human person must be founded on the metaphysics of morals. In a publication dated May 1930 and entitled *L'être et subjectif*, Marc writes about the new metaphysics of the person in opposition to traditional metaphysics. In the new metaphysics, the human being only exists in action: “On ne connaît l'être qu'en tant qu'on le réalise” (Roy 2003, 21). Marc links this insight to the philosophy of action and its primordiality in the work of Maurice Blondel. Mounier and Marc went their separate ways in 1933 after discussions,...
about the direction the *Ordre Nouveau* was going to take. For Mounier, Marc was flirting too much with totalitarian tendencies.12 A second source of inspiration for Mounier as a young intellectual was Jacques Maritain’s *Primauté du Spirituel* (1927) in which he develops the idea that the spiritual dimension is interwoven with politics, economics and social concerns but never assimilated.

In *Manifeste au service du personnalisme* (1936 – *A Personalist Manifesto* [1938]), Mounier describes society as a ‘bourgeois civilization’, meaning a soulless, indifferent world, denying both the poverty of many people and the hopes of the youth, and threatening the very spiritual roots of faith (1938, 13ff.). In finding no divinity in creation, no humanity in life, bourgeois culture is deprived of all values and ideals. Since sovereign individualism, and liberalism as its political expression, is central to a bourgeois culture, Mounier holds it accountable for the worst evils: negating a humanization of the economy by accepting the dominance of the profit motive and production/consumption drive at the expense of societal needs and the dignity of the worker. The individualist bourgeois mentality corrupts public and social life by promoting self-interest in all spheres of human activity and “caused Western man to lose contact with God, nature, and mankind” (Amato 1975, 130).13 Furthermore, he develops a more dialectical critique on both liberal bourgeois individualism and all contemporary forms of collectivism, which are in theory and in fact its opposite (fascism, national socialism, and communism; 1938, 28-66). Mounier considers the generation of his time to be split between liberal individualism and collectivist systems, which are all in fact ‘inverted theocracies’ in that they share its dehumanizing tendencies. But he also makes a distinction between them. While Marxism is the ultimate denial of the realms of freedom, Mounier nevertheless values several aspects of Marxism: (1) it offers a legitimate justification for the historical role of the oppressed ‘proletarians’; (2) it correctly analyzes hidden interests and practices within bourgeois ideology; (3) it launches a stimulus for improving society by voicing the legitimate needs of the oppressed; in doing so,
it actually symbolizes, for the world, liberation from oppression; and, (4)
it rightly discusses modern men and women’s alienation from their own
work and life (1938, 45-46). In fact, Mounier integrates these insights into
his Personalism. In the *Manifesto*, he even presents it as Personalism’s
greatest test: effecting “the separation of true spiritual values from the
established disorder of our day and the separation of Marxism from the
revolution that is imperative” (1938, 46). Towards the end of his life, he
was to become more critical of Marxism.

Personalism is Mounier’s response to the dramatic situation of the
industrial age, which he characterized as capitalist in its structure, liberal
in its ideology, bourgeois in its ethics: “On the altar of this sad world
there is but one god, smiling and hideous; the Bourgeois. He has lost the
ture sense of being, he moves only amongst things, and things that are
practical and that have been denuded of their mystery. He is a man with-
out love, a Christian without conscience, an unbeliever without passion.
(…) Comfort is to the bourgeois world what heroism was to the Renaiss-
ance and sanctity to mediaeval Christianity – the ultimate value, the ulti-
mate motive for all action” (1938, 17-18). To respond to this, Personal-
ism, as a ‘philosophy of combat’, must become a new ‘historical deal’
(Mounier borrowed this notion from Maritain) and the leading spiritual
and philosophical guide in order ‘to remake the Renaissance’.14 At the
heart of the new personalist movement is Mounier’s statement of the
primacy of the person, which has to be defended against all that is antihu-
man: “No other person … no collective whole, no organism, can legiti-
ately utilize the person as a means to its end” (1938, 69). In comparison
with all other realities, the person is an absolute because he/she is “a free
being that adopts, assimilates, lives and affirms values which constitute
his uniqueness, authenticate his worth…” (Amato 1975, 130). In *Le Per-
sonnalisme*, Mounier describes this move as follows: “The person is not an
object that can be separated and inspected, but is a centre of re-orienta-
tion of the objective universe…” (1952, xxviii). “The name [= personal-
ism] was born of a response to the expansion of the totalitarian drive,
against this drive, in order to stress the defense of the person against the tyranny of apparatus” (1952, 113).

Similar to the concept of the person as antithesis of the bourgeois individual, Mounier makes the concept of community the antithesis of modern society. A community is defined as a set of different relationships in which people treat each other as persons (from family and social groups to the state). Communities relate the world of the self with the world of other human beings and can be qualified according to the degree to which they destroy or perfect human persons. For personalists, the family is the first and most natural community, and it must never be controlled by the state. Concerning education, Mounier avoids two extremes. Neither formation by the state alone, nor by the family alone, is preferable because both would propagate the false values of the extant society. In fact, he promotes a mixed educational form, a combination of both public and private education, expecting from it the greatest contribution to the formation of communities. The deeper question is a cultural one: how to bring about a culture that rests on a universal understanding and valuing of what art is, and that simultaneously allows for freedom and spontaneity of creation by individual persons, something that is essential for any authentic art and culture? “For the aim of Personalism is also to give to every man the maximum true culture of which he is capable” (1938, 161).

In Chapter Eleven of the Manifesto, ‘Capitalism as Enemy of the Person’ (165-188), Mounier blames the ‘primacy of economics’, which has progressively subordinated our freedom and needs to the mechanisms of the market, profit, and production since the eighteenth century. Capitalism’s inherent feature – “to ignore the person and to organize itself for a single quantitative and impersonal goal, profit” (1938, 177) – is responsible for the fact that money and the use of it equally demonize human relationships. In fact, capitalism exercises several forms of usury: “(a) Preferential deduction of profits by capital over against labor through insufficiency of salaries (...); safeguarding of profits by deflating salaries in times of crisis; prosperity and rationalization conducted almost exclusively to the advantage of
capital. (b) Within capitalism itself, the preference in profits and power that is enjoyed by big capital over small capital. There is no need here to denounce the pseudo-democracy of anonymous corporations, the omnipotence which a minority of stockholders can acquire in them by cornering shares, by the plural vote, and by the guilty indifference of the mass of small stockholders who agree to the monopolizing of these powers by the banks, (...). Nor is there any need to point to the various devices which directors use for gathering in the cream of a multiple profit, bonuses, false balance-sheets, etc.” (1938, 181-182). Speculation and a usurious credit system create an autonomous system in which human values and real needs disappear; capitalists reduce workers to “a raw material to be bought at the lowest price” (1938, 183) and consumers to paying credit cards and “one of the coordinates in the profit-curve” (1938, 184). “The wielders of this power never seem to have acknowledged that the worker is a person, that he can have any rights and dignity” (1938, 184). His massive attack on capitalism (“Capitalism, Enemy of Labor and of Responsibility”, ‘Capitalism, the Enemy of Liberty’) is combined with a refusal to accept, for various reasons, revisionist solutions, like returning to the medieval guild system, social-democratic market interventions, moderating the excesses of market forces, or the communist’s centralized state economy (1938, 169-172). Personalist economics subordinates economics to persons, be they labourers or consumers. It is not capital but labour that is central to the market economy. The primacy of labour over capital rests on the fact that human work is the one and only agent that is productive in economic activity. He adds that while work should not be made the exclusive definition of human beings, it must be recognized as an essential human activity that partly completes the person. “But in order that labor may thus develop its human riches without avenging itself upon the integral nature of man or of society, it is indispensable that the conditions which surround it be human …” (1938, 198). Accordingly, “labor is a universal obligation. He who can work and does not do so should not eat. (...) Labor is not a commodity but a personal activity. The right to work is an inalienable right of the person” (1938, 199).
Mounier’s idea of a personalist economics opens up the question of a personalist politics (1938, 225-252). In his opinion, only the state can guarantee a person-centred economics. A precarious task, because states rarely return power once they have it. Mounier remains very critical vis-à-vis modern nation-states, whatever their form, be it fascist, statist, liberal or communist (“all variants of one and the same malignant reality” [1938, 232]). Amato concludes: “Sounding like a proponent of the anarchist tradition, Mounier went on to say that it was the state which had ‘annexed all economic life’ and constituted ‘the most formidable menace which personalism had to encounter in the political arena’” (1975, 137).

Against all kinds of ‘statism’, Mounier presents a pluralist state, based upon inter-personal, regional and national communities at the service of persons and societies: “The political reality is composed of persons, who seek to embody their communitarian will, and of societies, or groups of men, who are united in the pursuit of some human goal or in the expression of an affective or a spiritual relationship” (1938, 232). On one hand, the sovereignty of the pluralist state is restricted, affirming the absolute rights of persons and societies (all “particular sovereignties”), while on the other, it has sufficient authority to take care of essential social reforms and maintain personal rights. The personalist state will encourage personal initiative and various types of social cooperation. Avoiding both anarchic/absolute individualism and absolutizing popular sovereignty, the personalist democracy favours a decentralized, small state promoting autonomous bodies in matters of business and education. At the level of both European and international politics, he believes that neither a reform of nation-states, nor a balance between justifiable internationalism and justifiable nationalism will help cure the international disorder. He suggests four measures: “the disappearance of the nationalistic state”; “the dissociation of peace and of the institutions of peace from the entire disorder of modern civilization”; “a general and controlled disarmament along with progressive elimination of conscription”; and “the gradual establishment of a juridical society of nations endowed with an organism
capable of adaptation and revision” (1938, 261-262). On this particular point, his *Manifesto* has inspired many European leaders anticipating European federalism, no longer based on sovereign states but on living societies of persons and peoples. However incomplete in their presentation, Mounier’s ideas were soon to become influential in the creation of the European Union by presenting Personalism as a new historical ideal for Europe.

Finally, as Mounier would say, “personalists are not liberals.” Truth, be it ‘human’ or ‘superhuman’, cannot remain a private affair; truth must be capable of penetrating institutions as well as individuals. Therefore, it is the duty of the state to guarantee both the fundamental status of the person and the free functioning of spiritual communities. Coercion can only be justified in situations in which individuals or a group threatens the material independence or the spiritual liberty of even a single person, or in situations of anarchy. “The essential thing is that the states withdraw after every such interference, and restore to the constituted bodies of the nation the initiatives which it has taken to safeguard the common weal” (1938, 237).

In his evaluation of the aspirations of the *Manifesto*, Amato mentions that Mounier’s Personalism can be estimated in two ways. It could be seen as “an accurate perception of the fundamental problems afflicting Europe in the 1930’s and an authentic program for any real reconstruction of contemporary man and civilization. Negatively, it is possible to argue (…) that Mounier’s Personalism was utopian, and is best understood today as a historical document from a past epoch rather than a living doctrine for contemporary man. (…) Conversely, it might be maintained in a positive rather than a negative sense, that Mounier is utopian only to the degree that anyone must be who is truly committed to what man is today and what man can be tomorrow” (1975, 140-141). I think that Amato is wrong here. Not only has *Esprit* deeply influenced, for instance, the US Catholic Worker movement, founded by Dorothy Day and the Frenchman Peter Maurin in 1933 (Rourke and Rourke 2005,
10-11), but in October 2000 under the presidency of Paul Ricoeur and Jacques Delors (former EU-president), an international colloquium was organized in Paris in order to commemorate Emmanuel Mounier (Colloque Emmanuel Mounier, actualité d’un grand témoin) for his major contribution to the formation of the European Union. With regard to the other point of critique, readers today will definitely find it difficult to accept the apocalyptical expressions used by Mounier in his time (‘the rise and fall of civilizations’, ‘the end of civilization’). Although these expressions should be understood as metaphorical language, Mounier prefers to use such apocalyptical language – not unusual at that time – in order to express the urgency of finding solutions to the fundamental and enduring dilemmas of individuals and groups, society and state, state and church, solutions that would not only be beneficial for humankind, but also contribute to the creation of a much needed and entirely new human order.

IV. JACQUES MARITAIN’S HUMANISME INTÉGRAL – TRUE HUMANISM (1936)

Thomist thought at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century was based on manuals. Following in the footsteps of his inspiring master Henri Bergson15, Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) sought to move scholasticism beyond its past, as is already clear in Bergson’s final work Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932). Maritain became interested in Thomism because it is a perennial philosophy, in principle understandable for both believers and non-believers.

Maritain’s stance on the human person is particularly relevant for the present study. Drawing on his philosophical past – in Trois Réformateurs (1925) he describes, rather polemically, Luther’s theology as a “débordement d’individualité” – he makes the distinction between the individual and the person: “Voyez avec quelle solennité religieuse le monde moderne a proclamé les droits sacrés de l’individu, et de quel prix il a payé cette proclamation. (...). Le monde moderne confond simplement deux
chooses que la sagesse antique avait distinguée: il confond l’individualité et la personnalité” (1925, 28). The notion of individual is used for human beings, animals, plants and microbes. It contains a material component that we have in common with all others, whereas the notion of person is used as synonym for “une substance individuelle complète, de nature intellectuelle et maîtresse de ses actions,” covering the spiritual. While individuality, based on a material component, differentiates my human being from other living things, it is personality and its spiritual component that allows the moving out from self to others in freedom and love (“capable de donner et de se donner”). The distinction between individuality and personality is in fact a classic one. From this metaphysical view of the person, he derives his ethical view of personalization. Referring to Thomas, he states that the “Person signifies what is most perfect in all nature – that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature.”

In the 1930’s, both Mounier and Maritain defended similar ideas about the necessity of a new humanism due to the crisis facing their contemporary civilization. In fact Humanisme intégral can be considered his first attempt to describe the nature of a new civilization. Maritain’s ideas cannot be understood without understanding his evolution from personal involvement in, and later disapproval of, the reactionary Action Française to a kind of defence of democratic pluralism in the mid-1930’s, in line with Mounier’s pluralist state. But Maritain is more explicit on the Christian face of the new humanism, while simultaneously refuting any kind of person-centred humanism: “[This] kind of humanism believes that man is his own centre, and therefore the centre of all things. It implies a naturalistic conception of man and of freedom. (...) [It] merits the name of inhuman humanism, and its dialectic must be regarded as the tragedy of humanism” (1938, 19-20). In opposition to what he calls ‘anthropocentric humanism’ – the essence of the modern crisis, that declares men and women naturally good, the measure of being and the purpose of existence in the past and the future – Maritain believes that modernity, having started out declaring the human being sovereign and autonomous,
will end in the hands of Darwin and Freud, by claiming that he/she is no more than an immanent part of a biological process: “In fine, man is but the place of intersection and of conflict of a primarily sexual libido and a desire for death” (20-21). Maritain concludes that the individual is ripe for abdication: “ ... ready to abdicate in favour of the collective man” (22). In line with Mounier, Maritain is of the opinion that the emergence of collectivisms and the bankruptcy of bourgeois individualism oblige us to choose between “annihilation” and “a new order of Christian civilization.” The “new Christendom” will not be a repetition of the sacral medieval system, but “secular and lay”. In a partially independent secular order, a Christian philosophy of society and politics – which, like Mounier’s Personalism, is clearly in opposition to collectivism and individualism – will establish, in line with Thomas, two principles: the principle of the common good and the spiritual value of the individual person. In conformity with the nature of things, the goal of politics is the common good of people. This common good consists of the good life, respecting the dignity of each person, and preserving justice. But politics looks at only one part of human life. Human life has in fact two goals, of which one is subordinated to the other. An important goal in the given order is the terrestrial common good (bonum vitae civili); another is the absolute goal, which is the eternal, transcendent common good. Individual ethics recognizes the terrestrial common good but is ultimately oriented towards the absolute good (Valadier 2007, 88-89). Based on these two principles, Maritain describes a framework of a new humanistic society, politics and economics.

In his evaluation of Maritain, Amato writes: “Virtually point by point, Maritain’s framework corresponded with and anticipated that of Mounier’s Manifesto. The state was given sufficient strength to curb the anarchisms of capitalism, ‘liberal parliamentarian politics’, and juridical bourgeois law. Conversely, the state’s authority and the collectivisms of society were counterbalanced by a defense of the private life, family, and culture as domains of freedom, and by federalist, corporate, and pluralist concep-
tions of society and politics. In essence, Maritain also aspired to a ‘pluralist democracy’” (1975, 144).22 Like Mounier, Maritain presents his Christian humanism as a “new concrete historical idea,” a valuable ideological alternative to liberalism and socialism; a real alternative because it offers a distinct and developing understanding of the human being and the world. In their defence of the person, the family as the first society, and other societies supported by a pluralist state, and in their “aspirations to serve the worker and destroy the greatest abuses” of the capitalist system, both Mounier’s and Maritain’s thoughts of the 1930’s can be read in critical support of parts of later Catholic Social Teaching.

V. LOUIS JANSSENS’ PERSONNE ET SOCIÉTÉ (1939)

The personalist philosophy of the early 1930’s was to become the main inspiration for Janssens’ entire work. Since Personalism is identified with personal and communitarian freedom and creativity, any systematization is impossible. As a result, the discomfort that this brings was also to be experienced in the work of Louis Janssens. Over and above the aforementioned personalist ideas of Mounier and Maritain, Janssens is also influenced by three other philosophies: the existentialism of Kierkegaard, the phenomenology of Edmond Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Max Scheler, and the neo-scholastic revival in Leuven in the early twentieth century. They all provided fertile ground for Janssens’ personalism. We shall consider here the impact of Scheler’s phenomenology and neo-Thomism in Leuven on the early Janssens.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the phenomenological ideas of Edmond Husserl and Martin Heidegger had an effect on the writings of Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Rahner, both of whom were soon to become important for every kind of theology. Janssens’ work resembles Heideggerian ideas, such as the detailed description of various aspects of the human person, already mentioned in Sein und Zeit (1927). Human
beings have to become themselves in a particular historical and temporal context, responsible yet not in total control. It is Max Scheler (1874-1928), however, who was to become the most influential phenomenologist for Janssens.

Scheler was praised by Heidegger in his *In memoriam Max Scheler* as “the strongest philosophical force in modern Germany, nay, in contemporary Europe and in contemporary philosophy as such” (1984, 50). Scheler, a modest follower of Husserl’s phenomenology, produced his *habilitation* thesis under the guidance of Rudolf Eucken in Jena. Afterwards, he took up a teaching appointment at Jena from 1900 to 1906 before moving to Munich, where he conducted an in-depth study of Husserl’s phenomenology, although he was never enthusiastic about the latter or even about Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* (1927). Edith Stein was one of his students during the year he spent at Göttingen in 1910. It was certainly during his Cologne period from 1919 onwards that Scheler became very influential in Catholic circles, one of the reasons why Pope John Paul II wrote his doctoral dissertation on him, resulting in the publication of his *Osoba I czyn – The Acting Person.* In 1923, Scheler met the Russian emigrant philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev who lived in Paris at the time and who had regular contact with Mounier and Maritain. Scheler is, in fact, one of the very few German philosophers who, as early as 1928, warned in public speeches of the danger of the growing Nazi movement in Germany. His works were therefore censured under the Nazi regime.

Phenomenology, for Scheler, is focused on a particular philosopher’s attitude and important for the observation of phenomenological facts. It is a moral attitude because the strength of the exercise rests upon love. The act of love is important because love, as value cognition, determines the way in which we approach the world: “Love and hate are acts in which the value-realm accessible to the feelings of a being (…) is either extended or narrowed” (1973, 261). Love and hate, as spiritual feelings, may not be presented as sensible feelings because of their characteristic of having an intentional function (one always loves/hates somebody or some-
The intentional feeling of love discloses a value because love transforms a person, making him or her ever more open towards other ‘beings-of-value’. The seat of the value-a priori is thus in the acts of feeling, where cognition of values takes place (Frings 1965, 67). Therefore, the axiological reality of values is always prior to knowing: “Man is, before he can think or will, ens amans” (Scheler 1957, 356). It is precisely his notion of ‘emotive a priori’ that gives expression to the idea that values can only be felt, never reasoned. Reason cannot think values. Such spiritual feelings are thus value-cognitions. Not only formal propositions but also material ones belong to the extended realm of the a priori. Kant would not have accepted this, which explains his formalism in ethics. Values for Scheler can vary, although this does not imply that they are relative. Values do not exist apart from their bearers, i.e. persons as loci of value experiencing. His idea of the person bearing the valuing process and thus of autonomy and creativity is taken up by Janssens. But this is not the only point.

For Scheler, value comprehension, founded in love or hatred, is a matter of preferring one value to another (Ordo amoris).²⁴ Love and hatred govern all standards of appreciation of values. Resentment, a psychic self-poisoning process, takes place in virtue of the confusion of the Ordo amoris.²⁵ The way Scheler treats the theme of love is rather unique in contemporary philosophy since love has rarely been treated as a philosophical subject.

In part two of his Formalismus (1916), Scheler introduces the notion ‘Person’, which is for him intrinsically connected to non-formal ethics. He believes that we do not need a formal theory to illustrate the autonomy and dignity of the human person, thereby criticizing Kant’s identification of the person with the rational. Is the person not more than a “logical subject of rational acts” (Spader 2002, 102)? He makes a strict distinction between ‘ego’, ‘person’, and ‘substance’ in the scholastic sense. The person is not a metaphysical entity but an intuitional reality given in each of our acts. One understands Scheler’s person only if one under-
stands his *Aktlehre* and the questions that unite all human acts of different natures (willing, loving, feeling, judging, thinking, etc.). He presents the person as the ‘unity-of-acts-of-different-natures’ (‘Person ist die konkrete, selbst wesenhafte Seinseinheit von Akten verschiedenartigen Wesens’; 1973, 328). The sphere of the entire person is in every act: “… in every completely concrete act the whole person is present, and the whole person ‘varies’ in and through every act – without its being dissolved in any one of its acts, or being ‘transformed’ through time” (384). Since persons are the bearers of moral values, they are unique individuals, developed in the idea of the “individual-person value-essence”. This means that there is a good-in-itself for each person in particular. But what about universally valid norms? Scheler’s answer to this is: “the following obtains: all universally valid values (universally valid for persons) represent, in relation to the highest value, i.e. the sainthood of the person, and in relation to the highest value, i.e. ‘the salvation of an individual person,’ only a minimum of values; if these values are not recognized and realized, the person cannot attain his salvation. But the values do not in themselves incorporate all possible moral values through whose realization the person attains salvation” (1973, 492). Finally, there is the idea of intersubjectivity. One of the consequences of his conception of persons is that other persons can only be really known by way of co-execution of acts (*Mittvollzug*), co-acting, co-operation or co-thinking, a thinking together. So, persons can only be really understood in their interrelationships (1957, 186ff.).

In sum, Scheler’s non-formal ethics of value and ethical personalism were extremely important for Louis Janssens’ *Personne et société* (1939). After his profound critiques of several contemporary European ideologies, like fascism and communism – in line with Mounier – Janssens responds with his personalist alternative, which he develops in three stages: a) the human person as a totality; b) the moral person; and c) the person in relationship with God. Taking Scheler’s *Aktlehre* as a given, he presents the individual person as a ‘unity-of-acts-of-different-natures’.
a complex totality, existing in a spatio-temporal universe. It is not through reason but through the particularity of the body that human beings are able to actualize their human life in a particular time and space. Persons reveal themselves in their activities and these activities reveal persons to themselves (Janssens 1939, 207). This situated bodily being – and linked to it, its emotive a priori – is also the source of intellect and will and their non-temporal and non-spatial activities. After all, the desire for knowing is infinite and the appetite for the good is unlimited. Ideals are actualized through the singular choices of the person. The polarity between acting and being, between what is and the potentialities for becoming, describes the process of actualization of a person: “A person is a destiny: the person is form for self, value to be realized. For the person, to live, then, is to realize one’s value as person” (Janssens 1939, 3). Following Scheler’s idea of intersubjectivity and Aquinas’ idea of the social nature of the human being, Janssens accepts that persons can only be really known by co-operation: without community life, human beings are unable to fulfil their destiny (217). Reciprocal relationships rest on a value a priori. In fact, Janssens adopts Scheler’s idea that the axiological reality of values is prior to knowing. If human beings open themselves to the world, they are also open to a world of pre-existing values (220). Following Maritain, Janssens distinguishes between the human being as individual and the human person. Individuality contains a material component, characterized by its concrete position in space and time and utterly distinct from other entities, while the person and his/her spiritual component (‘le moi spirituel’) facilitate a movement away from the self towards others in freedom and love. This ‘moi spirituel’ cannot be completely known by others, not even by the self. Only God knows it.

Moral theology, for Janssens, is grounded in an attractive idea about truth and good, which exist independently of the human being. The optimum is harmony between the will directing categorical action towards the good and the intellect’s orientation towards truth. Concretely, subjective personal choices towards self-actualization must be rooted in objective
standards of what it means to be a human person: “… the human being will have to ask him/herself: what is it that objectively is suitable to my personal totality in order to lead a life worthy of a person” (Janssens 1939, 235). The person is not only understood as the highest value – a unity of acts, as Scheler would put it –, he/she is able to control the hierarchy of values by using his/her ordo amoris, a flexible undertaking influenced by the love of others in which love opens each person for growth towards higher values. The individual responses will therefore vary in correlation with the ability to share visions with others.

And finally, there is another aspect raised by the revival of scholastic thinking at the beginning of the twentieth century and which is important in order to understand L. Janssens’ Personne et société. Although neo-scholastic philosophy was not part of the personalist programme, the idea of making a synthesis between science and metaphysics was an interesting undertaking. The renewal of Thomist thought raised the question as to its relationship with modern scientific discoveries, which was furthered by Désiré Joseph Mercier, later Cardinal Mercier (1851-1926). Mercier was convinced that Thomas’s insights, believing that all knowledge comes first through the senses, were compatible with modern empirical scientific insights, based on sensate data. For Mercier, philosophy must dialogue with science. Neo-Scholasticism wanted to restore a kind of hierarchical view of the various strands in human knowledge, including the sciences that deal with physical nature. Bringing together a variety of analyses into a synthetic view is the challenge of philosophy, a task that presupposes an intimate acquaintance with the findings of modern sciences. In his A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, Mercier writes: “It [= Philosophy] has for its object, not the discovery of any new objects of knowledge by way of analysis whether direct or indirect, but the synthetic explanation of the results already reached by analysis” (1916-1917, 407). The object of philosophy is to find a common intelligible aspect, what Aristotle defines as the knowledge of things by their causes or principles. Mercier sees the same law governing both sciences and philosophy: “the closest possible
knowledge of the material world is the proper, adequate and natural object of the human intellect” (Boileau 1996, 110). Although it is difficult to build a synthesis based on the inductive analysis of so many different exact sciences, Mercier is convinced that philosophy is able to do this. His much repeated formula reads: “vetera novis augere et perficere”, blending tradition and innovation. The rethinking of Thomism in function of contemporary needs must end in a kind of synthesis based on an attempt to understand the facts established by science from a metaphysical perspective. He maintains that scientific facts may not be used in a kind of apologetic theological discourse but one must devote oneself “to a particular science for its own sake” (Copleston 1982, 249). An illustration of this: “It was in this spirit that he was instrumental in founding, for example, the laboratory of experimental psychology which won merited respect and fame under the direction of Professor Michotte, who had studied in Germany under Wundt” (Copleston 1982, 249). Therefore, under the influence of the Thomist revival, Janssens respects any kind of sound knowledge outside theology, and this respect is characteristic of his approach.

An obvious illustration of Janssens’ integration of all these views, in particular his respect for other sciences, is the attention he gives to authors who introduce a more person-centred view in the ethics of marriage. Although he does not fully agree with their opinions, the works of Dietrich von Hildebrand (Reinheit und Jungfranlikheit, 1927) and Heribert Doms (The Meaning of Marriage, 1939) are important for understanding the shift to the person that was developing in the theology of marriage before the mid-twentieth century. Their personalist approach changes the traditional focus on the ends of marriage – especially the end of the act of intercourse – “to a perspective which concentrated on the meaning of marriage” (Christie 1990, 15). According to von Hildebrand, “The intentio unitiva (purpose of uniting) contained in all love acquires in the love peculiar to marriage an entirely new function, unitive in the fullest sense; it becomes the leitmotiv of this relationship. (…) There is, further, the
specific mutual completion which this unitive tendency effects in the case of man and wife. And, finally, there is the special way of ‘being in love’ in the noblest sense of that expression, which puts a specific stamp upon wedded love, that peculiar and most intense receptivity for which the entire charm of the other nature, in its unique individuality (...) holds us captive” (1935, 97-98). Von Hildebrand moves away from a preoccupation with the biological aspects of the marital act – in fact, a preoccupation with procreation – to a concern for the relational meaning of marriage. As a consequence, dealing with sexuality, von Hildebrand writes: “… the only love which can transform sex is essentially a love solemnly sanctioned by the person himself. It cannot just exist. The free spiritual core of our personality must expressly approve it, must so to speak, declare its full assent…” (98). For Hildebrand, an extrinsic goal, such as procreation, is always subordinated to the I-Thou relationship of the couple. The consequences of this personalist shift are monumental.

VI. Conclusion

The events of the late 1930’s, however, were to strip the personalist dreams of much of their content. The project of the new Christendom was eclipsed by the scope of the coming war. “It meant that the world was to be reordered once again not by the spirit but the deed, not by ideals and revolutions, but tanks and planes” (Amato 1975, 146). Mounier and Maritain joined the side of Republican France. For Mounier, the devaluation of the human person became a reality when Hitler invaded and defeated France. The Vichy government suppressed the journal Esprit in August 1941 for its ‘subversive’ character. Mounier himself became a member of the resistance movement Combat and was to be imprisoned for a short time by the Vichy regime in 1942. Both Mounier and Maritain idealized the Resistance, but things evolved differently for Maritain. When the War started in 1940, Maritain was lecturing in the United States where
he remained for the rest of the war. He became more optimistic about the modern world and was soon to become an advocate of a particular kind of liberalism. In *Man and State* (1951), Maritain was to deny the sovereignty of modern nation-states and was to propose, as an alternative, the primacy of the person and communities, and the need for a so-called ‘body politic’, a natural law based approach in which rights are assured, full participation is promoted, and power is divided. Amato concludes: “As the War had led Maritain further in the direction of what can be called the ‘liberalism of Woodrow Wilson,’ so it led Mounier towards what might equally boldly be called the ‘socialism of Jean Jaurès’” (1975, 18). The differences between Mounier’s Personalism and Maritain’s Integral or True Humanism were to become profound in the post Second World War era, although they remained personal friends. While Mounier opted for social revolution in order to create a more just and equal society, Maritain believed in a philosophical renaissance of freedom and law. These profound differences were likewise to become visible in their professional careers. Maritain became French ambassador to the Vatican, and returned in 1948 to the United States where he was to remain until his retirement. Mounier, on the other hand, stayed on at *Esprit* in Paris.

Joseph Amato summarizes the impact of both men in a surprising way: “Of the two men, however, it is Mounier who most fully speaks to, and is an example for man today. Far more than Maritain, Mounier knew and taught the fact that man is a historical creature, subjected to the domain of radical change, forced to experience yesterday’s thoughts falling short of today’s happenings. (...) However, the worth of Mounier lay not in what he acknowledged regarding man’s limit, but in what he hoped for in terms of man’s potentials. (...) Recognizing man’s historicity, he taught men to be responsible for one another, to resist a world that was turned against man, to live beyond the realities of sterile sciences and egotisms, degrading politics and ideologies. He taught men further to live for those things that matter most – truth, love, friendship, conscience – those things alone that give man a final dignity … ” (1975, 163).
Strangely enough, Dolores Christie reports that by 1986 Louis Janssens no longer thought very highly of the work he did in commenting on the various European ideologies in the first part of Personne et société – precisely the core of what Mounier did in the Manifesto (Christie 1990, 26 n.2). We do not know exactly why. The personalist traditions described here are all considered forms of idealism, because personalists believe that the mind is never reducible to some material substance. They all share the fact that they give reasons to present the person as the supreme principle, based on arguments referring to human actions, spirit and intelligence as constitutive for human beings. Janssens’ particular type of personalism is characterized by Bernard Häring as a radical I-Thou-We personalism. The radical I-Thou-We personalism is styled by Häring as “being-a-person in word and love” (1968, 21). Personhood does not spring from within the individual; rather it is called forth by the other. For a Christian, it is called forth in the relationship with God, the “true Thou before whom I am an I” (1968, 10). The personal understanding of being oneself in confrontation with others (= the Thou) is our most profound experience. Therefore, personhood is called forth by others. Through the encounter with the unique other, one discovers oneself to be a unique, irreplaceable, worthwhile person. For Häring, people exist as persons in word and love. Mutual dependency rather than individualism forms the context of personal growth. This type of personalism is reflected in the works of Mounier, Barth, Bonhoeffer, Buber, Scheler, Richard Niebuhr, Marcel and Janssens. The personalist awareness of the early twentieth century was to inspire a whole movement in opposition to any kind of Verdinglichung or instrumentalization of the human being.

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NOTES

1. Hubert Eugene Langan, “The Philosophy of Personalism and Its Educational Applications” (Ph.D. diss. The Catholic University of America, 1935), 13. The word ‘person’, as can be seen in the definition of Boethius, is derived from two sources: first, the Greek word *hypostasis* (from *hyposthēmi*, corresponding with the Latin *substantia*), which means individuality, and second, from the Latin word *persona*, which served as a translation of *hypostasis* but which originally meant an actor’s mask. In connection with the Trinitarian disputes of the early church (three hypostases appeared to conflict with the Nicene doctrine of unity of substance in the Trinity), the first council of Constantinople in 381 determined its meaning. The word *persona* and its Greek equivalent *prosopon* were accepted as synonymous with *hypostasis*. See Catholic Encyclopaedia (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/item ‘Person’).

2. *Summa* III, Q. xvi, a. 12, ad 2um.

3. Eucken admitted that Lotze was undoubtedly the most important thinker of those decades, although he was personally disappointed with his lectures: “His lectures were distinguished for their learning, clearness and acuteness; but they were too technical for most of the audience, and to me they offered little that was of use in regard to the problems which occupied me (…) His philosophy seemed to me too much a matter of learning. It had too little bearing and influence on the totality of life.” Cf. Rudolf Eucken, *Rudolf Eucken: His Life, Work and Travels*, translated by Joseph McCabe (London: T. Fisher Unwin/Adelphi Terrace, 1921), 59.


6. Chapter three of Burrow’s *God and Human Dignity. The Personalism, Theology, and Ethics of Martin Luther King, Jr.* is entitled *King and Personalism* (69-87) and is entirely devoted to arguments in favour of the fact that King chose Boston University in order to get acquainted with the personalist tradition of Bowne, Knudson, DeWolf and Brightman. Burrow states that King acknowledged personalism as his favourite philosophy for his struggle for social justice. See also, Paul Deats, *Introduction to Boston Personalism*, in *The Boston Personalist Tradition in Philosophy, Social Ethics and Theology*, edited by Paul Deats and Carol Robb (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press: Leuven: Peeters, 1986), 4-5.

7. See also Emily Hermann, *Eucken and Bergson. Their Significance for Christian Thought* (Boston: The Pilgrim Press; London: James Clarke, 1912).

8. Charles Renouvier, *Le Personalisme, suivi d’une étude sur la perception externe et sur la force* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1903), vi: “Le néocriticisme (…) est en opposition décisive avec tous les points caractéristiques de la doctrine kantienne, un relativisme net, qui est en même temps le personalisme. En voie les termes: toute connaissance est un fait de conscience qui suppose un sujet, à savoir, la conscience elle-même, et un objet représenté; et toute représentation est un rapport, ou un groupe de rapports assemblés par une loi. Une loi est une relation générale. La plus générale, que toutes les autres supposent, est la Relation elle-même. Cette première des catégories, considérée, non plus abstraitement, mais dans un vivant théâtre de représentations, est la loi de conscience, ou de personnalité …”. See also, Gilbert Vincent, “Préface. L’injuste oubli d’une grande oeuvre,” in *Le personnalisme critique de Charles Renouvier. Une philosophie française*, ed. Fernand Turlot (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2003), 17: “Dans le titre du présent ouvrage, il est question de ‘personnalisme’. N’y voyons aucun étiquetage abusive: c’est le terme même choisi par Renouvier pour titre d’une de ses dernières publications (…). Le vocable de ‘critique’, quant à lui, spécifie avec bonheur ce personnalisme, né bien avant celui d’Emmanuel Mounier et sensiblement différent de lui. (…) Techniquement, la philosophie de Renouvier se présente comme un ‘néo-criticisme’”.


13. In understanding both Mounier’s and Maritain’s disdain for liberalism, an interesting debate was initiated by W. William Salomone (“The Risorgimento between Ideology and History: The Political Myth of rivoluzione mancata,” *American Historical Review*, LXVIII (October 1962): 38-56, who says that their serious critique is due to two things: conservative religious sources that oppose modernity (science, reason, progress); and the confusion by French intellectuals of American/English inspired liberalism with Manchester liberalism/capitalism.


15. Bergson is a key figure in the development of French personalism. He inspired Léon
Bloy, who convinced Maritain to become a Catholic, and the poet Charles Péguy, who was admired by Mounier. He also deeply influenced Levinas and many other personalist figures. Bergson is crucial in the move from ‘ontological personalism,’ which could be considered as a traditional metaphysical theory of personhood, to a more ‘existential personalism.’ As alternative for the ruling ideas of naturalism and positivism, he developed a kind of personalism concentrating on the creative capabilities of human persons who feel intuitively the inner and spiritual dynamics of present time (the ‘élan vital’ of evolution). He calls this creative and intuitive capability ‘mysticism.’ See, Luc Bouckaert, “Mounier en de utopie van economische democratie,” Ethische perspectieven 10/4 (2000): 225.


17. Summa I, a. xxix, 3.


21. Later, as the Second World War developed, the once ‘capitalistic United States’ represented for Maritain ever more an approximation of his historical ideal of a new Christendom (see, Amato, 156). Jacques Maritain expressed it as follows: “While at the time of writing Integral Humanism [1934] my perspective was definitely European… I gradually became aware of the kind of congeniality which existed between what is going on in this country and a number of views I had expressed in Integral Humanism” (Jacques Maritain, Reflections on America [Garden City, New York: Scribner, 1958, 2nd ed., 1964], 101-102).

22. See Maritain, True Humanism, pp. 156 ff. In fact, it is interesting to note that Mounier’s and Maritain’s proposals for a pluralist, organic and decentralized society have parallels in the works of very different thinkers like the young Marx, Lammenais, Proudhon, De Tocqueville and Mazzini with whom they were familiar.


25. Cf. Max Scheler, Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1912; re-edited 1978).


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28. See also, Manfred Frings, “Man as Person,” in *Max Scheler*, 133-148.
